---
title: "Minds as simulators · Simulations · Simulation Hypothesis"
url: https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/mind-simulations
description: "The simulations that brains run: dreaming, imagining, modelling other minds, play, and modelling the body and the world."
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
credit: "Ross Allan Dahl, Simulation Hypothesis (simulation-hypothesis.com)"
---

[Simulations](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations)domain 13 of 18

# Minds as simulators

The simulations that brains run: dreaming, imagining, modelling other minds, play, and building models of the body and the world.

Many accounts in psychology and neuroscience say brains don't just register the world. They simulate it. Dreaming replays and recombines the day's experience, and none of it is real. Rehearsing a movement before making it, working out what another person thinks, and a child feeding a toy dinner all do the same thing. Each runs a model forward and reads off the result before acting, or instead of acting. Predictive accounts go further. They describe perception, memory and social thinking as simulation: always predicting what comes next and correcting for what arrives. Enactive and ecological accounts reject that picture of perception. This section covers the simulations documented in humans and other animals, not the computers built to imitate them.

## Sleep and dreaming

### REM dreaming

The vivid, narrative dreams of rapid-eye-movement sleep, built from memory fragments and emotion with little conscious control.

Question it answers: What does the sleeping brain construct once it is cut off from the senses?

Leaves out: Physical consistency: flying, dead relatives and rooms that rearrange themselves pass without complaint.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a sleeping human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1953 Aserinsky and Kleitman's discovery of REM sleep In the simulations tree: [Dreams](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=w-dreams)

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Lucid dreaming

Knowing you are dreaming while the dream continues, sometimes with enough control left over to steer what happens next.

Question it answers: Can a dreamer recognise, from inside it, that it is a dream?

Leaves out: Awakening, which commonly interrupts the episode just as it becomes absorbing.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a sleeping human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1913 Frederik van Eeden coined the term from his dream diaries

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Hippocampal replay in rats

Place-cell firing sequences recorded while a rat runs a maze, then replayed in the same order during rest and sleep.

Question it answers: Does the brain rerun a route it has already travelled?

Leaves out: Anything the animal has not just experienced: replay only reruns the recent past.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a rat brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1994 Wilson and McNaughton's report of hippocampal reactivation during sleep In the simulations tree: [Hippocampal replay](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=min-replay)

[Network models](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-network)floor: Cells

### Threat-simulation theory of dreams

The idea that dreams exist to rehearse dangerous encounters, tested by counting threat content across many recorded dreams.

Question it answers: Do dreams train the brain to handle threats it has not yet met?

Leaves out: Explaining why so many dreams concern mundane failures, such as missing a bus, rather than threats.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a sleeping human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 2000 Antti Revonsuo's threat-simulation theory of dreaming

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Sleep-dependent memory consolidation

Skills and facts learned before sleep, tested again afterwards to see what the brain reprocessed and strengthened overnight.

Question it answers: What does the brain rehearse and strengthen while the body is unconscious?

Leaves out: It doesn't say which memories get picked, or why those and not others.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a sleeping human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1924 Jenkins and Dallenbach's nonsense-syllable retention study

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Hypnagogic imagery

Vivid, fragmentary perceptual images that appear as the brain disengages from the senses while falling asleep.

Question it answers: What does the brain generate when input from the world is fading but consciousness has not yet switched off?

Leaves out: Coherence: hypnagogic images rarely add up to a story.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a drowsy human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1848 Alfred Maury's description of hypnagogic hallucinations

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Hippocampal preplay

Place cells fire in sequences for places never yet visited, as if the brain rehearsed paths in advance.

Question it answers: Does the brain simulate journeys before it takes them?

Leaves out: Later work questions how much of preplay is truly predictive.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2011 by 2011, Dragoi and Tonegawa, Preplay of future place cell sequences [source](https://doi.org/10.1038/nature09633)

[Network models](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-network)floor: Cells

## Imagination and planning

### Mental rehearsal in athletes

Athletes running through a routine or shot in their head, activating much of the same motor circuitry as performing it for real.

Question it answers: Can practising a movement only in imagination improve performance of the real thing?

Leaves out: Fatigue, anxiety and the genuine risk of failure.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess an athlete's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1932 Edmund Jacobson recorded muscle activity during imagined movement

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Bodies

### Episodic future thinking

Constructing a detailed personal scene of a specific future event, using much of the same machinery used to recall the past.

Question it answers: What will a particular future moment be like, in enough detail to plan for it?

Leaves out: Accuracy: imagined futures borrow freely from memory and are often wrong in the details.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 2001 Atance and O'Neill named episodic future thinking

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Counterfactual thinking

Replaying a past event with one detail changed, to see how differently things would have turned out.

Question it answers: What would have happened had the agent acted otherwise?

Leaves out: Ever running the real alternative to check the answer.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1982 Kahneman and Tversky's simulation heuristic paper

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Mental rotation

Rotating an imagined three-dimensional object in the mind's eye to decide whether it matches another view of the same shape.

Question it answers: Is this the same object, seen from a different angle?

Leaves out: The object entirely: nothing physical actually turns.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1971 Shepard and Metzler's mental rotation experiment

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Mental navigation

Picturing a route through a familiar place before walking or driving it, using the same spatial map the brain keeps for real navigation.

Question it answers: Which route reaches the destination, before any movement is made?

Leaves out: Traffic, weather and any changes to the place since it was last visited.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1948 Tolman's cognitive-map studies in rats and men

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Mind-wandering and daydreaming

Spontaneous, self-generated trains of thought about hypothetical people, places and events, running whenever attention is not needed elsewhere.

Question it answers: What does the brain simulate when it has nothing else to do?

Leaves out: Staying on topic.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess an idle human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1966 Singer's systematic study of daydreaming

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Constructive episodic simulation

Remembering is a rebuilding of past events from stored pieces, the same system that imagines what might happen.

Question it answers: Is recalling the past the same act as imagining the future?

Leaves out: It is a hypothesis about memory, not a mechanism with parameters.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2007 Schacter and Addis’s account of remembering and imagining as one constructive system [source](https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2087) In the simulations tree: [Imagining the future](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=min-episodic)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Motor imagery

Imagining a movement without doing it, which engages much of the same neural machinery as performing it.

Question it answers: Does imagining a movement run the brain's motor program?

Leaves out: Imagery can be vague or absent, and its timing varies among people.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1994 by 1994, Jeannerod, The representing brain: neural correlates of motor intention and imagery [source](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00034026)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Visual mental imagery

Pictures in the mind's eye that can be scanned, zoomed and inspected, with effort rising with distance.

Question it answers: Is a mental image like a picture that can be scanned?

Leaves out: Whether images are pictorial or descriptive remains disputed.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1973 by 1973, Kosslyn, Scanning visual images: some structural implications [source](https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03198621)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Affective forecasting

People simulate how they will feel in a future event and mispredict its intensity and duration.

Question it answers: How well can people predict their own future feelings?

Leaves out: The forecast is of a few feelings, not of a full life.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1998 by 1998, Gilbert and others, Immune neglect [source](https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.617)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Mental models of reasoning

The mind holds a small-scale model of how things work and uses it to try out actions before taking them.

Question it answers: Does reasoning work by running a small model of the world?

Leaves out: Craik gave an idea, not a testable theory of how models are built.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1943 by 1943, Craik, The Nature of Explanation [source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth%5FCraik) In the simulations tree: [Craik’s model in the head](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=min-craik)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)[Physical analogue](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-analogue)floor: Bodies

### Vicarious trial and error

A rat pauses at a choice point and looks back and forth between options as if trying each in turn.

Question it answers: Does a rat deliberate by sampling the outcomes of paths?

Leaves out: Behaviour shows deliberation, but not what is in the animal's mind.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1938 by 1938, Tolman, The determiners of behavior at a choice point [source](https://doi.org/10.1037/h0062733)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Future planning in animals

A bird caches food in the place where it expects to be hungry, acting on a simulated future need.

Question it answers: Can an animal plan for a need it does not feel now?

Leaves out: Simpler learning rules can explain some of these results.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2007 by 2007, Raby and others, Planning for the future by western scrub-jays [source](https://doi.org/10.1038/nature05575)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

## Other minds

### Theory of mind

Modelling what another person knows, wants or believes, including cases where that differs from what is actually true.

Question it answers: What does this other person think is going on?

Leaves out: Ever checking the model directly against what they actually think.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1978 Premack and Woodruff coined theory of mind

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Empathy as simulation theory

Feeling something of another person's state by running a version of their situation through one's own emotional and bodily systems.

Question it answers: What would the observer feel in the other person's position?

Leaves out: The difference between self and other, which is where empathy most often fails.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1986 Gordon's simulation theory of folk psychology In the simulations tree: [Simulating other minds](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=soc-gordon)

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Bodies

### Mirror systems

Neurons that fire both when an action is performed and when it is watched in someone else.

Question it answers: Can understanding another's action be simulating it in one's own motor system?

Leaves out: Explaining understanding that has no matching action, such as watching a fish swim.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a macaque brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1992 Di Pellegrino, Fadiga and colleagues report mirror neurons

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Network models](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-network)floor: Cells

### Audience design

Predicting what a listener already knows and needs explained, before choosing how to say something.

Question it answers: What must the speaker simulate on the listener's behalf?

Leaves out: Directly querying the listener.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1987 Isaacs and Clark on references between experts and novices

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Visual perspective-taking

Working out what another person can see from where they are standing, by mentally moving to their point of view.

Question it answers: What does the scene look like from the other person's position rather than the observer's own?

Leaves out: The step in toddlers, who assume that everyone sees what they see.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1948 Piaget and Inhelder's three mountains task

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Joint attention

Following another person's gaze or point to work out what they are looking at, then checking back to confirm the target is shared.

Question it answers: What is currently capturing their attention?

Leaves out: The underlying thought, tracking only the target of it.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess an infant's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1975 Scaife and Bruner on joint visual attention in infants

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Fiction as social simulation

Reading stories runs a model of social life, strengthening the reader's grasp of other people's minds.

Question it answers: Does fiction train the mind to simulate other people?

Leaves out: Evidence for a lasting gain in social skill is mixed.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2008 by 2008, Mar and Oatley, The function of fiction is the abstraction and simulation of social experience [source](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00073.x)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

## Play and pretence

### Children's pretend play

A child treating a banana as a telephone, or an empty cup as full of tea, running an invented layer of meaning over the real objects.

Question it answers: What would happen if this object were something else?

Leaves out: Any objection when the pretend layer contradicts the real one.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a child's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1945 Piaget's study of symbolic play in children In the simulations tree: [Children’s pretend play](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=w-pretend)

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Rules

### Animal play as practice

Young mammals wrestling, chasing and stalking without consequence, using movements drawn from real hunting and fighting.

Question it answers: Does harmless play rehearse skills the animal will need for real later?

Leaves out: Establishing whether play is merely intrinsically rewarding.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a young mammal's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1898 Groos's practice theory of animal play

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Imaginary companions

A sustained, named, invented character that a child talks to and negotiates with over weeks or years.

Question it answers: Can a fully invented other mind still be useful to think with?

Leaves out: Continuity: for most children the companion fades by about age seven.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a child's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1934 Svendsen's early study of children's imaginary companions

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Rules

### Sociodramatic play

Groups of children jointly acting out invented roles and scenes, negotiating the rules of the pretend world as they go.

Question it answers: Can several separate imaginations run the same simulated scene together?

Leaves out: Sustained maintenance of character.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess several children's brains; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1933 Vygotsky's lecture on play and child development

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)[Agent-based](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-agent-based)floor: Rules

### Paracosms

An elaborate invented world, with its own geography, history and rules, built and maintained in the imagination over months or years.

Question it answers: How much internal consistency can an invented world sustain?

Leaves out: Any requirement that others share the belief.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a child's or adult's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1826 the Brontë children’s Glass Town, from 1826; Silvey’s survey of childhood paracosms followed in 1976 [source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%5FTown) In the simulations tree: [Glass Town](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/trees/simulations?n=w-bronte)

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Rules

### Object play in primates

Wild chimpanzees carrying and cradling a stick the way they would hold an infant, well past the age of ordinary play.

Question it answers: Can play stand in for a skill an animal has not yet had a chance to practise?

Leaves out: Knowing whether the chimpanzee is pretending in any human sense.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a chimpanzee's brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 2010 Kahlenberg and Wrangham on stick-carrying in wild chimpanzees

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

## The brain's world model

### Predictive processing

The brain generating a running prediction of its own sensory input, and updating only on the mismatch with what arrives.

Question it answers: What does the world probably look like right now, before the senses even report it?

Leaves out: Explaining where the very first prediction ever came from.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1999 Rao and Ballard's predictive coding model of visual cortex

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Motor forward models

A copy of a movement command run forward to predict its sensory consequences, ready before the real feedback arrives.

Question it answers: What will this movement feel and look like, before it has finished?

Leaves out: The actual movement, which occasionally disagrees with the prediction.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1995 Wolpert, Ghahramani and Jordan's internal-model paper

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Differential equations](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-equations)floor: Bodies

### The body schema

A running model of where the body's own parts are and how large they are, updated by touch, sight and movement, and susceptible to manipulation, as in the rubber-hand illusion.

Question it answers: Where are the body's parts, and where does the body end?

Leaves out: Frequent obvious error, which makes illusions striking when it does occur.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1911 Head and Holmes introduced the body schema

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Bodies

### Hallucination as uncontrolled prediction

Perception with the balance tipped too far towards prediction and away from incoming evidence, so the model is experienced as though it were the world.

Question it answers: What happens to perception when prediction stops being corrected by evidence?

Leaves out: Explaining every kind of hallucination equally well.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 2009 Fletcher and Frith's Bayesian account of hallucination

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Blind-spot filling-in

The visual system generating plausible content for the small blind spot in each eye's field of view, matched to the surrounding pattern.

Question it answers: What is probably there, in the one place the eye cannot see?

Leaves out: Any verification of the inferred content, since nothing appears obviously missing.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 1992 Ramachandran's studies of blind-spot filling-in

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Rules

### Interoception

A running prediction of the body's internal state, heartbeat, breathing, hunger and gut, checked against the actual signals arriving from inside.

Question it answers: What is the current internal state of the body?

Leaves out: Conscious access: most people can report on it only rarely.

Runs on: about 10^16 FLOPS wild guess a human brain; Sandberg and Bostrom-style estimate Documented since: 2013 Seth's predictive account of interoceptive inference

Models: [Human](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/entities/human)

[Learned emulators](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-learned)floor: Bodies

### Thought as simulated action

Thinking is covert action and perception: the brain runs its own motor and sensory systems offline to rehearse outcomes.

Question it answers: Is conscious thought the brain simulating its own behaviour and perception?

Leaves out: Competing accounts explain the same results with symbols.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2002 by 2002, Hesslow, Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and perception [source](https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613%2802%2901913-7)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)[Physical analogue](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-analogue)floor: Bodies

### Grounded cognition

Concepts are reactivations of sensory and motor states stored from experience, not abstract symbols.

Question it answers: Does understanding a concept re-run the experience of it?

Leaves out: Abstract concepts are hard to explain by sensory reenactment.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1999 by 1999, Barsalou, Perceptual symbol systems [source](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99002149)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### The phenomenal self-model

The sense of being a self is a model the brain builds of its own body and state and cannot see as a model.

Question it answers: Is the self a simulation that the brain does not recognise as one?

Leaves out: It is a philosophical framework, not an experimentally tested mechanism.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2003 by 2003, Metzinger, Being No One [source](https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1551.001.0001)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Body ownership illusions

Brushing a hidden hand and a visible rubber hand together makes the rubber hand feel like one's own.

Question it answers: How does the brain decide which body is yours?

Leaves out: Strength of the illusion varies widely among people.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 1998 by 1998, Botvinick and Cohen, the rubber hand illusion [source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber%5Fhand%5Fillusion)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### Embodied language simulation

Understanding a sentence involves mentally simulating the scene it describes, including shapes and orientations.

Question it answers: Do readers build a mental scene while reading?

Leaves out: Some replications give weak effects.

Runs on: no computer. the brain, no computation counted Documented since: 2001 by 2001, Stanfield and Zwaan, implied orientation and picture recognition [source](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00326)

[Rules and states](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-rules)floor: Bodies

### The intuitive physics engine

The brain predicts how objects will fall, collide and stack by running approximate physical simulations in the head.

Question it answers: Does judging a falling tower use an internal physics simulation?

Leaves out: The model fits some judgements, and fails on others.

Runs on: about 10^9 FLOPS rough a laptop, seconds per judgement Documented since: 2013 by 2013, Battaglia, Hamrick and Tenenbaum, Simulation as an engine of physical scene understanding [source](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1306572110)

[Particles and N-body](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-particles)[Stochastic processes](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-stochastic)[Real time](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/methods#m-real-time)floor: Bodies

[◂ Mathematics and computation](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/mathematics-computation)[Training simulators ▸](https://simulation-hypothesis.com/simulations/training)
